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Abstract
Despite their tremendous success in a range of domains, deep learn-
ing systems are inherently susceptible to two types of manipula-
tions: adversarial inputs – maliciously crafted samples that deceive
target deep neural network (DNN) models, and poisoned models
– adversely forged DNNs that misbehave on pre-defined inputs.
While prior work has intensively studied the two attack vectors in
parallel, there is still a lack of understanding about their fundamen-
tal connections: what are the dynamic interactions between the
two attack vectors? what are the implications of such interactions
for optimizing existing attacks? what are the potential countermea-
sures against the enhanced attacks? Answering these key questions
is crucial for assessing and mitigating the holistic vulnerabilities of
DNNs deployed in realistic settings.
Here we take a solid step towards this goal by conducting the
first systematic study of the two attack vectors within a unified
framework. Specifically, (i) we develop a new attack model that
jointly optimizes adversarial inputs and poisoned models; (ii) with
both analytical and empirical evidence, we reveal that there exist
intriguing “mutual reinforcement” effects between the two attack
vectors – leveraging one vector significantly amplifies the effective-
ness of the other; (iii) we demonstrate that such effects enable a
large design spectrum for the adversary to enhance the existing
attacks that exploit both vectors (e.g., backdoor attacks), such as
maximizing the attack evasiveness with respect to various detection
methods; (iv) finally, we discuss potential countermeasures against
such optimized attacks and their technical challenges, pointing to
several promising research directions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The abrupt advances in deep learning have led to breakthroughs in
a number of long-standing machine learning tasks (e.g., image clas-
sification [14], natural language processing [42], and even playing
Go [45]), enabling scenarios previously considered strictly experi-
mental. However, it is now well known that deep learning systems
are inherently vulnerable to adversarial manipulations, which sig-
nificantly hinders their use in security-critical domains, such as
autonomous driving, video surveillance, web content filtering, and
biometric authentication.
Two primary attack vectors have been considered in the litera-
ture. (i) Adversarial inputs – typically through perturbing a benign
input x , the adversary crafts an adversarial version x∗ which de-
ceives the target DNN f at inference time [7, 20, 40, 48]. (ii) Poisoned
models – during training, the adversary builds malicious functions
into f , such that the poisoned DNN f∗ misbehaves on one (or more)
pre-defined input(s) x [24, 25, 44, 47]. As illustrated in Figure 1, the
two attack vectors share the same aim of forcing the DNN to mis-
behave on pre-defined inputs, yet through different routes: one
perturbs the input and the other modifies the model. There are
attacks (e.g., backdoor attacks [21, 32]) that leverage the two attack
vectors simultaneously: the adversary modifies f to be sensitive
to pre-defined trigger patterns (e.g., specific watermarks) during
training and then generates trigger-embedded inputs at inference
time to cause the poisoned model f∗ to malfunction.
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Figure 1: “Duality” of adversarial inputs and poisoned models.
Prior work has intensively studied the two attack vectors sep-
arately [7, 20, 24, 25, 40, 44, 47, 48]; yet, there is still a lack of un-
derstanding about their fundamental connections. First, it remains
unclear what the vulnerability to one attack implies for the other.
Revealing such implications is important for developing effective
defenses against both attacks. Further, the adversary may exploit
the two vectors together (e.g., backdoor attacks [21, 32]), or mul-
tiple adversaries may collude to perform coordinated attacks. It
is unclear how the two vectors may interact with each other and
how their interactions may influence the attack dynamics. Under-
standing such interactions is critical for building effective defenses
against coordinated attacks. Finally, studying the two attack vectors
within a unified framework is essential for assessing and mitigating
the holistic vulnerabilities of DNNs deployed in practice, in which
multiple attacks may be launched simultaneously.
More specifically, in this paper, we seek to answer the following
research questions.
• RQ1 – What are the fundamental connections between adversarial
inputs and poisoned models?
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• RQ2 –What are the dynamic interactions between the two attack
vectors if they are applied together?
• RQ3 – What are the implications of such interactions for the adver-
sary to optimize the attack strategies?
• RQ4 – What are the potential countermeasures to defend against
such enhanced attacks?
OurWork. This work represents a solid step towards answering
the key questions above. We cast adversarial inputs and poisoned
models within a unified framework, conduct a systematic study of
their interactions, and reveal the implications for DNNs’ holistic
vulnerabilities, leading to the following interesting findings.
RA1 – We develop a new attack model that jointly optimizes
adversarial inputs and poisoned models. With this framework, we
show that there exists an intricate “duality” relationship between
the two attack vectors. Specifically, they represent different routes
to achieve the same aim (i.e., misclassification of the target input):
one perturbs the input at the cost of “fidelity” (whether the attack
retains the original input’s perceptual quality), while the other
modifies the DNN at the cost of “specificity” (whether the attack
influences non-target inputs).
RA2 – Through empirical studies on benchmark datasets and in
security-critical applications (e.g., skin cancer screening [16]), we
reveal that the interactions between the two attack vectors demon-
strate intriguing “mutual-reinforcement” effects: when launching
the unified attack, leveraging one attack vector significantly ampli-
fies the effectiveness of the other (i.e., “the whole is much greater
than the sum of its parts”). We also provide analytical justification
for such effects under a simplified setting.
RA3 – Further, we demonstrate that the mutual reinforcement
effects entail a large design spectrum for the adversary to optimize
the existing attacks that exploit both attack vectors (e.g., back-
door attacks). For instance, leveraging such effects, it is possible
to enhance the attack evasiveness with respect to multiple defense
mechanisms (e.g., adversarial training [34]), which are designed to
defend against adversarial inputs or poisoned models alone; it is
also possible to enhance the existing backdoor attacks (e.g., [21, 32])
with respect to both human vision (in terms of trigger size and
transparency) and automated detection methods (in terms of input
and model anomaly).
RA4 – Finally, we demonstrate that to effectively defend against
such optimized attacks, it is necessary to investigate the attacks
from multiple complementary perspectives (i.e., fidelity and speci-
ficity) and carefully account for the mutual reinforcement effects in
applying the mitigation solutions, which point to a few promising
research directions.
To our best knowledge, this work represents the first systematic
study of adversarial inputs and poisoned models within a unified
framework. We believe our findings deepen the holistic understand-
ing about the vulnerabilities of DNNs in practical settings and shed
light on developing more effective countermeasures.1
1The source code and data are released at https://github.com/alps-lab/imc.
Notation Definition
x◦, x∗ benign, adversarial inputs
θ◦, θ∗ benign, poisoned DNNs
t adversary’s target class
κ misclassification confidence threshold
D, R, T training, reference, target sets
ℓ, ℓs, ℓf attack efficacy, specificity, fidelity losses
ϕ leverage effect coefficient
α learning rate
ϵ, δ thresholds of input, model perturbation
Table 1. Symbols and notations.
Roadmap. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. § 2
introduces fundamental concepts; § 3 presents a new attack frame-
work that unifies adversarial inputs and poisoned models; § 4 re-
veals the inherent connections between the two attack vectors; § 5
studies the implications of such connections for optimizing exist-
ing attacks and discusses potential countermeasures; § 6 surveys
relevant literature; the paper is concluded in § 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We begin by introducing a set of fundamental concepts and assump-
tions. Table 1 summarizes the important notations in the paper.
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
Deep neural networks (DNNs) represent a class of machine learn-
ing models to learn high-level abstractions of complex data using
multiple processing layers in conjunction with non-linear trans-
formations. We primarily consider a predictive setting, in which a
DNN f (parameterized by θ ) encodes a function f : X → Y. Given
an input x ∈ X, f predicts a nominal variable f (x ;θ ) ranging over
a set of pre-defined classes Y.
We consider DNNs obtained via supervised learning. To train
a model f , the training algorithm uses a training set D, of which
each instance (x ,y) ∈ D ⊂ X × Y comprises an input x and its
ground-truth class y. The algorithm determines the best parameter
configurationθ for f via optimizing a loss function ℓ(f (x ;θ ),y) (e.g.,
the cross entropy of y and f (x ;θ )), which is typically implemented
using stochastic gradient descent or its variants [55].
2.2 Attack Vectors
DNNs are inherently susceptible to malicious manipulations. In
particular, two primary attack vectors have been considered in the
literature, namely, adversarial inputs and poisoned models.
Adversarial Inputs. Adversarial inputs are maliciously crafted
samples to deceive target DNNs at inference time. An adversarial
input x∗ is typically generated by perturbing a benign input x◦ to
change its classification to a target class t desired by the adversary
(e.g., pixel perturbation [34] or spatial transformation [1]). To ensure
the attack evasiveness, the perturbation is often constrained to a
feasible set (e.g., a norm ball Fϵ (x◦) = {x |∥x −x◦∥∞ ≤ ϵ}). Formally,
the attack is formulated as the optimization objective:
x∗ = arg min
x ∈Fϵ (x◦)
ℓ(x , t ;θ◦) (1)
where the loss function measures the difference between f ’s pre-
diction f (x ;θ◦) and the adversary’s desired classification t .
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Eqn (1) can be solved in many ways. For instance, FGSM [20] uses
one-step descent along ℓ’s gradient sign direction, PGD [34] applies
a sequence of projected gradient descent steps, while C&W [7] solves
Eqn (1) with iterative optimization.
PoisonedModels. Poisonedmodels are adversely forged DNNs
that are embedded with malicious functions (i.e., misclassification
of target inputs) during training.
This attack can be formulated as perturbing a benign DNN θ◦ to
a poisoned version θ∗.2 To ensure its evasiveness, the perturbation
is often constrained to a feasible set Fδ (θ◦) to limit the impact
on non-target inputs. For instance, Fδ (θ◦) = {θ |Ex ∈R [| f (x ;θ ) −
f (x ;θ◦)|] ≤ δ } specifies that the expected difference between θ◦
and θ∗’s predictions regarding the inputs in a reference set R stays
below a threshold δ . Formally, the adversary attempts to optimize
the objective function:
θ∗ = arg min
θ ∈Fδ (θ◦)
Ex◦∈T [ℓ(x◦, tx◦ ;θ )] (2)
where T represents the set of target inputs, tx◦ denotes x◦’s classi-
fication desired by the adversary, and the loss function is defined
similarly as in Eqn (1).
In practice, Eqn (2) can be solved through either polluting train-
ing data [21, 44, 47] or modifying benign DNNs [24, 32]. For in-
stance, StingRay [47] generates poisoning data by perturbing be-
nign inputs close to x◦ in the feature space; PoisonFrog [44] synthe-
sizes poisoning data close to x◦ in the feature space but perceptually
belonging to t in the input space; while ModelReuse [24] directly
perturbs the DNN parameters to minimize x◦’s distance to a repre-
sentative input from t in the feature space.
2.3 Threat Models
We assume a threat model wherein the adversary is able to exploit
both attack vectors. During training, the adversary forges a DNN
embedded with malicious functions. This poisoned model is then
incorporated into the target deep learning system through either
system development or maintenance [24, 32]. At inference time, the
adversary further generates adversarial inputs to trigger the target
system to malfunction.
This threat model is realistic. Due to the increasing model com-
plexity and training cost, it becomes not only tempting but also
necessary to reuse pre-trained models [21, 24, 32]. Besides rep-
utable sources (e.g., Google), most pre-trained DNNs on the market
(e.g., [6]) are provided by untrusted third parties. Given the wide-
spread use of deep learning in security-critical domains, adversaries
are strongly incentivized to build poisoned models, lure users to
reuse them, and trigger malicious functions via adversarial inputs
during system use. The backdoor attacks [21, 32, 54] are concrete
instances of this threat model: the adversary makes DNN sensitive
to certain trigger patterns (e.g., watermarks), so that any trigger-
embedded inputs are misclassified at inference. Conceptually, one
may regard the trigger as a universal perturbation r [36]. To train
the poisoned model θ∗, the adversary samples inputs T from the
training set D and enforces the trigger-embedded input (x◦ + r )
for each x◦ ∈ T to be misclassified to the target class t . Formally,
2Note that below we use θ◦ (θ∗) to denote both a DNN and its parameter configuration.
Also note that the benign model θ◦ is independent of the target benign input x◦ .
the adversary optimizes the objective function:
min
r ∈Fϵ ,θ ∈Fδ (θ◦)
Ex◦∈T [ℓ(x◦ + r , t ;θ )] (3)
where both the trigger and poisoned model need to satisfy the eva-
siveness constraints. Nonetheless, in the existing backdoor attacks,
Eqn (3) is often solved in an ad hoc manner, resulting in subopti-
mal triggers and/or poisoned models. For example, TrojanNN [32]
pre-defines the trigger shape (e.g., Apple logo) and determines its
pixel values in a preprocessing step. We show that the existing at-
tacks can be significantly enhanced within a rigorous optimization
framework (details in § 5).
3 A UNIFIED ATTACK FRAMEWORK
Despite their apparent variations, adversarial inputs and poisoned
models share the same objective of forcing target DNNs (modified
or not) to misclassify pre-defined inputs (perturbed or not). While
intensive research has been conducted on the two attack vectors in
parallel, little is known about their fundamental connections.
3.1 Attack Objectives
To bridge this gap, we study the two attack vectors using input
model co-optimization (IMC), a unified attack framework. Intuitively,
within IMC, the adversary is allowed to perturb each target input
x◦ ∈ T and/or to poison the original DNN θ◦, with the objective of
forcing the adversarial version x∗ of each x◦ ∈ T to be misclassified
to a target class tx◦ by the poisoned model θ∗.
Formally, we define the unified attack model by integrating the
objectives of Eqn (1), Eqn (2), and Eqn (3):
min
x ∈Fϵ (x◦),θ ∈Fδ (θ◦)
Ex◦∈T [ℓ(x , tx◦ ;θ )](4)
where the different terms define the adversary’s multiple desiderata:
• The loss ℓ quantifies the difference of the model prediction and
the classification desired by the adversary, which represents the
attack efficacy – whether the attack successfully forces the DNN
to misclassify each input x◦ ∈ T to its target class tx◦ .
• The constraint Fϵ bounds the impact of input perturbation on
each target input, which represents the attack fidelity – whether
the attack retains the perceptual similarity of each adversarial
input to its benign counterpart.
• The constraint Fδ bounds the influence of model perturbation
on non-target inputs, which represents the attack specificity –
whether the attack precisely directs its influence to the set of
target inputs T only.
Specificity
Efficacy
Fidelity
Figure 2: Adversary’s multiple objectives.
This formulation subsumes many attacks in the literature. Specif-
ically, (i) in the case of δ = 0 and |T | = 1, Eqn (4) is instantiated as
the adversarial attack; (ii) in the case of ϵ = 0, Eqn (4) is instantiated
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as the poisoning attack, which can be either a single target (|T | = 1)
or multiple targets (|T | > 1); and (iii) in the case that a universal
perturbation (x − x◦) is defined for all the inputs {x◦ ∈ T } and all
the target classes {tx◦ } are fixed as t , Eqn (4) is instantiated as the
backdoor attack. Also note that this formulation does not make any
assumptions regarding the adversary’s capability or resource (e.g.,
access to the training or inference data), while it is solely defined
in terms of the adversary’s objectives.
Interestingly, the three objectives are tightly intertwined, form-
ing a triangle structure, as illustrated in Figure 2. We have the
following observations.
• It is impossible to achieve all the objectives simultaneously. To
attain attack efficacy (i.e., launching a successful attack), it requires
either perturbing the input (i.e., at the cost of fidelity) or modifying
the model (i.e., at the cost of specificity).
• It is feasible to attain two out of the three objectives at the same
time. For instance, it is trivial to achieve both attack efficacy and
fidelity by setting ϵ = 0 (i.e., only model perturbation is allowed).
• With one objective fixed, it is possible to balance the other two.
For instance, with fixed attack efficacy, it allows to trade between
attack fidelity and specificity.
Next, by casting the attack vectors of adversarial inputs and poi-
soned models within the IMC framework, we reveal their inherent
connections and explore the dynamic interactions among the attack
efficacy, fidelity, and specificity.
3.2 Attack Implementation
Recall that IMC is formulated in Eqn (4) as optimizing the objectives
over both the input and model. While it is impractical to exactly
solve Eqn (4) due to its non-convexity and non-linearity, we refor-
mulate Eqn (4) to make it amenable for optimization. To ease the
discussion, in the following, we assume the case of a single target
input x◦ in the target set T (i.e., |T | = 1), while the generalization
to multiple targets is straightforward. Further, when the context is
clear, we omit the reference input x◦, benign model θ◦, and target
class t to simplify the notations.
3.2.1 Reformulation. The constraints Fϵ (x◦) and Fδ (θ◦) in
Eqn (4) essentially bound the fidelity and specificity losses. The
fidelity loss ℓf (x) quantifies whether the perturbed input x faith-
fully retains its perceptual similarity to its benign counterpart x◦
(e.g., ∥x − x◦∥); the specificity loss ℓs(θ ) quantifies whether the
attack impacts non-target inputs (e.g., Ex ∈R [| f (x ;θ ) − f (x ;θ◦)|]).
According to optimization theory [5], specifying the bounds ϵ and
δ on the input and model perturbation amounts to specifying the
hyper-parameters λ and ν on the fidelity and specificity losses (the
adversary is able to balance different objectives by controlling λ
and ν ). Eqn (4) can therefore be re-formulated as follows:
min
x,θ
ℓ(x ;θ ) + λℓf (x) + νℓs(θ )(5)
Nonetheless, it is still difficult to directly optimize Eqn (5) given
that the input x and the model θ are mutually dependent on each
other. Note that however ℓf does not depend on θ while ℓs does
not depend on x . We thus further approximate Eqn (5) with the
following bi-optimization formulation:{
x∗ = arg minx ℓ(x ;θ∗) + λℓf (x)
θ∗ = arg minθ ℓ(x∗;θ ) + νℓs(θ ) (6)
3.2.2 Optimization. This formulation naturally leads to an
optimization procedure that alternates between updating the input
x and updating the model θ , as illustrated in Figure 3. Specifically,
let x (k ) and θ (k ) be the perturbed input and model respectively after
the k-th iteration. The (k+1)-th iteration comprises two operations.
Input Perturbation
θ(k+1)
Classification Boundary
x(k)x(k+1)
θ(k)
Model Perturbation
Classification Boundary
x(k+1)
θ(k)∆x
∆θ
Figure 3: IMC alternates between two operations: (i) input perturba-
tion to update the adversarial input x , and (ii) model perturbation
to update the poisoned model θ .
Input Perturbation – In this step, with the model θ (k) fixed, it
updates the perturbed input by optimizing the objective:
x (k+1) = arg min
x
ℓ(x ;θ (k )) + λℓf (x) (7)
In practice, this step can be approximated by applying an off-
the-shelf optimizer (e.g., Adam [26]) or solved partially by applying
gradient descent on the objective function. For instance, in our
implementation, we apply projected gradient descent (PGD [34]) as
the update operation:
x (k+1) = ΠFϵ (x◦)
(
x (k) − α sgn
(
∇x ℓ
(
x (k);θ (k )
)))
where Π is the projection operator, Fϵ (x◦) is the feasible set (i.e.,
{x |∥x − x◦∥ ≤ ϵ}), and α is the learning rate.
Model Perturbation – In this step, with the input x (k+1) fixed, it
searches for the model perturbation by optimizing the objective:
θ (k+1) = arg min
θ
ℓ(x (k+1);θ ) + νℓs(θ ) (8)
In practice, this step can be approximated by running re-training
over a training set that mixes the original training data D andm
copies of the current adversarial input x (k+1). In our implementation,
m is set to be half of the batch size.
Algorithm 1 sketches the complete procedure. By alternating be-
tween input and model perturbation, it finds approximately optimal
adversarial input x∗ and poisoned model θ∗. Note that designed to
study the interactions of adversarial inputs and poisoned models
(§ 4), Algorithm 1 is only one possible implementation of Eqn (4)
under the setting of a single target input and both input and model
perturbation. To implement other attack variants, one can adjust
Algorithm 1 accordingly (§ 5). Also note that it is possible to per-
form multiple input (or model) updates per model (or input) update
to accommodate their different convergence rates.
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Algorithm 1: IMC Attack
Input: benign input – x◦; benign model – θ◦; target class – t ;
hyper-parameters – λ, ν
Output: adversarial input – x∗; poisoned model – θ∗
// initialization
1 x (0), θ (0), k ← x◦, θ◦, 0;
// optimization
2 while not converged yet do
// input perturbation
3 x (k+1) = arg minx ℓ(x ; θ (k )) + λℓf (x );
// model perturbation
4 θ (k+1) = arg minθ ℓ(x (k+1); θ ) + ν ℓs(θ );
5 k ← k + 1;
6 return (x (k ), θ (k ));
3.2.3 Analysis. Next we provide analytical justification for
Algorithm 1. As Eqn (5) is effectively equivalent to Eqn (4), Algo-
rithm 1 approximately solves Eqn (5) by alternating between (i) in-
put perturbation – searching for x∗ = arg minx ∈Fϵ (x◦) ℓ(x ;θ∗) and
(ii) model perturbation – searching for θ∗ = arg minθ ∈Fδ (θ◦) ℓ(x∗;θ ).
We now show that this implementation effectively solves Eqn (5)
(proof deferred to Appendix A).
Proposition 1. Let x∗ ∈ Fϵ (x◦) be a minimizer of the function
minx ℓ(x ;θ ). If x∗ is non-zero, then ∇θ ℓ(x∗;θ ) is a proper descent
direction for the objective function of minx ∈Fϵ (x◦) ℓ(x ;θ ).
Thus, we can conclude that Algorithm 1 is an effective implemen-
tation of the IMC attack framework. It is observed in our empirical
evaluation that Algorithm 1 typically converges within less than
20 iterations (details in § 4).
4 MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT EFFECTS
Next we study the dynamic interactions between adversarial inputs
and poisoned models. With both empirical and analytical evidence,
we reveal that there exist intricate “mutual reinforcement” effects
between the two attack vectors: (i) leverage effect –with fixed attack
efficacy, at slight cost of one metric (i.e., fidelity or specificity), one
can disproportionally improve the other metric; (ii) amplification
effect – with one metric fixed, at minimal cost of the other, one can
greatly boost the attack efficacy.
4.1 Study Setting
Datasets. To factor out the influence of specific datasets, we
primarily use 4 benchmark datasets:
• CIFAR10 [27] – It consists of 32 × 32 color images drawn from 10
classes (e.g., ‘airplane’);
• Mini-ImageNet – It is a subset of the ImageNet dataset [14], which
consists of 224 × 224 (center-cropped) color images drawn from
20 classes (e.g., ‘dog’);
• ISIC [16] – It represents the skin cancer screening task from the
ISIC 2018 challenge, in which given 600 × 450 skin lesion images
are categorized into a 7-disease taxonomy (e.g., ‘melanoma’);
• GTSRB [46] – It consists of color images of size ranging from
29 × 30 to 144 × 48, each representing one of 43 traffic signs.
Note that among these datasets, ISIC and GTSRB in particular
represent security-sensitive tasks (i.e., skin cancer screening [16]
and traffic sign recognition [4]).
DNNs. We apply ResNet18 [23] to CIFAR10, GTSRB and Ima-
geNet and ResNet101 to ISIC as the reference DNN models. Their
top-1 accuracy on the testset of each dataset is summarized in Ta-
ble 2. Using two distinct DNNs, we intend to factor out the influence
of individual DNN characteristics (e.g., network capacity).
CIFAR10 ImageNet ISIC GTSRB
Model ResNet18 ResNet18 ResNet101 ResNet18
Accuracy 95.23% 94.56% 88.18% 99.12%
Table 2. Accuracy of benign DNNs on reference datasets.
Attacks. Besides the IMC attack in § 3.2, we also implement
two variants of IMC (with the same hyper-parameter setting) for
comparison: (i) input perturbation only, in which IMC is instantiated
as the adversarial attack (i.e., PGD [34]), and (ii) model perturbation
only, in which IMC is instantiated as the poisoning attack. The
implementation details are deferred to Appendix B.
Measures. We quantify the attack objectives as follows.
Efficacy –Wemeasure the attack efficacy by the misclassification
confidence, ft (x∗;θ∗), which is the probability that the adversarial
input x∗ belongs to the target class t as predicted by the poisoned
model θ∗. We consider the attack successful if the misclassification
confidence exceeds a threshold κ.
Fidelity – We measure the fidelity loss by the Lp -norm of the
input perturbation ℓf (x∗) ≜ ∥x∗ − x◦∥p . Following previous work
on adversarial attacks [7, 20, 34], we use p = ∞ by default in the
following evaluation.
Specificity – Further, we measure the specificity loss using the
difference of the benign and poisoned models on classifying a ref-
erence set R. Let Iz be the indicator function that returns 1 if z is
true and 0 otherwise. The specificity loss can be defined as:
ℓs(θ∗) ≜
∑
x ∈R
If (x ;θ◦),f (x ;θ∗)
|R | (9)
With fixed attack efficacy κ, let (x∗,θ∗) be the adversarial input
and poisoned model generated by IMC, and x¯∗ and θ¯∗ be the ad-
versarial input and poisoned model given by the adversarial and
poisoning attacks respectively. Because the adversarial and poison-
ing attacks are special variants of IMC, we have x∗ = x¯∗ if θ∗ = θ◦
and θ∗ = θ¯∗ if x∗ = x◦. Thus, in the following, we normalize the
fidelity and specificity losses as ℓf (x∗)/ℓf (x¯∗) and ℓs(θ∗)/ℓs(θ¯∗) re-
spectively, both of which are bound to [0, 1]. For reference, the
concrete specificity losses ℓs(θ¯∗) (average accuracy drop) caused by
the poisoning attack on each dataset are summarized in Table 3.
κ CIFAR10 ImageNet ISIC GTSRB
0.75 0.22% 1.94% 1.62% 0.14%
0.9 0.25% 1.96% 1.63% 0.20%
Table 3. Specificity losses (average accuracy drop) caused by poison-
ing attacks on reference datasets.
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Figure 4: Disproportionate trade-off between attack fidelity and specificity.
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Figure 5: Sample inputs and surrounding classification boundaries
under various attacks onCIFAR10. The output of theDNN’s penulti-
mate layer is considered as the feature space, in which two random,
orthogonal directions are selected as the x- and y-axis, while each
colored region represents one distinct class. (a) ‘horse’ misclassified
as ‘deer’; (b) ‘airplane’ misclassified as ‘bird’.
4.2 Effect I: Leverage Effect
In the first set of experiments, we show that for fixed attack effi-
cacy, with disproportionally small cost of fidelity, it is feasible to
significantly improve the attack specificity, and vice versa.
4.2.1 Disproportionate Trade-off. For each dataset, we ap-
ply the adversarial, poisoning, and IMC attacks against 1,000 inputs
randomly sampled from the testset (as the target set T ), and use the
rest as the reference set R to measure the specificity loss. For each
input of T , we randomly select its target class and fix the required
attack efficacy (i.e., misclassification confidenceκ). By varying IMC’s
hyper-parameters λ and ν , we control the importance of fidelity
and specificity. We then measure the fidelity and specificity losses
for all the successful cases. Figure 4 illustrates how IMC balances
fidelity and specificity. Across all the datasets and models, we have
the following observations.
First, with fixed attack efficacy (i.e., κ = 0.75), by sacrificing dis-
proportionally small fidelity (i.e., input perturbation magnitude),
IMC significantly improves the attack specificity (i.e., accuracy drop
on non-target inputs), compared with required by the correspond-
ing poisoning attack. For instance, in the case of ISIC (Figure 4 (c)),
as the fidelity loss increases from 0 to 0.05, the specificity loss is
reduced by more than 0.48.
Second, this effect is symmetric: a slight increase of specificity
loss also leads to significant fidelity improvement, compared with
required by the corresponding adversarial attack. For instance, in
the case of CIFAR10 (Figure 4 (a)), as the specificity loss increases
from 0 to 0.05, the specificity loss drops by 0.4.
Third, the fidelity-specifcity trade-off is not sensitive to the attack
efficacy setting. Observe that across all the cases, the trade-offs
show similar patterns for κ = 0.75 and 0.9 and differ only slightly
in variance. Thus, we will fix κ = 0.75 in the following study.
Figure 5 showcases sample inputs and their surrounding classi-
fication boundaries in the feature space. Observe that IMC attains
the same efficacy but with much less fidelity or specificity loss
compared with the adversarial or poisoning attack.
Leverage Effect
There exists an intricate fidelity-specificity trade-off. At
disproportionally small cost of fidelity, it is possible to sig-
nificantly improve specificity, and vice versa.
4.2.2 Empirical Implications. The leverage effect has pro-
found implications. We show that it entails a large design spectrum
for the adversary to optimize the attack evasiveness with respect to
various detection methods (detectors). Note that here we do not con-
sider the adversary’s adaptiveness to specific detectors but rather
focus on exposing the design spectrum enabled from a detection
perspective. In § 5, we show that IMC also allows to enhance the at-
tacks by adapting to specific detectors. To assess IMC’s evasiveness,
we consider three complementary detectors.
Input Anomaly – From the input anomaly perspective, we apply
manifold transformation [35] as the detector. At a high level, it em-
ploys a reformer network to project given inputs to the manifold
spanned by benign inputs and a detector network to differenti-
ate benign and adversarial inputs. Besides, we apply randomized
smoothing [11] as another detector, which transforms a given DNN
into a “smoothed” model and considers a given input x∗ as adver-
sarial if the probability difference of x∗’s largest and second largest
classes exceeds a threshold.
Model Anomaly – From the model anomaly perspective, we apply
curvature profiling [38] as the detector. Recall that the poisoning
attack twists the classification boundary surrounding the target
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Figure 7: Average misclassification confidence (κ) as a function of fidelity and specificity losses.
input x∗; thus, the loss function tends to change abruptly in x∗’s
vicinity. To quantify this property, we compute the eigenvalues of
the Hessian Hx (x∗) = ∇2x ℓ(x∗). Intuitively, larger (absolute) eigen-
values indicate larger curvatures of the loss function. We define
the average (absolute) value of the top-k eigenvalues of Hx (x∗) as
x∗’s curvature profile: 1k
∑k
i=1 |λi (Hx (x∗))|, where λi (M) is the i-th
eigenvalue of matrix M (details in Appendix B). We compare the
curvature profiles of given inputs and benign ones, and use the
KolmogorovâĂŞSmirnov statistics to differentiate the two sets.
We apply the above detectors to the adversarial inputs and poi-
soned models generated by IMC under varying fidelity-specificity
trade-off (κ fixed as 0.75). Figure 6 measures the detection rates for
different datasets. We have the following observations.
The detection rate of input anomaly grows monotonically with
the fidelity loss (i.e., input perturbation magnitude); on the contrary,
the detection rate of model anomaly drops quickly with the fidelity
loss (i.e., disproportionate specificity improvement due to the lever-
age effect). For instance, in the case of ImageNet (Figure 6 (b)), as
the fidelity loss varies from 0 to 0.35, the detection rate of input
anomaly increases from 0.17 to 0.53 by manifold transformation
and from 0.16 to 0.47 by randomized smoothing, while the detection
rate of corresponding model anomaly drops from 0.63 to 0.44.
Moreover, across all the cases, IMC is able to balance fidelity and
specificity, leading to high evasiveness with respect to multiple
detectors simultaneously. For instance, in the case of CIFAR10 (Fig-
ure 6 (a)), with the fidelity loss set as 0.23, the detection rates of
manifold transformation, randomized smoothing, and curvature
profiling are reduced to 0.29, 0.43, and 0.29 respectively.
4.3 Effect II: Amplification Effect
Next we show that the two attack vectors are able to amplify each
other and attain attack efficacy unreachable by each vector alone.
4.3.1 Mutual Amplification. We measure the attack efficacy
(average misclassification confidence) attainable by the adversarial,
poisoning, and IMC attacks under varying fidelity and specificity
losses. The results are shown in Figure 7 We have two observations.
First, IMC realizes higher attack efficacy than simply combining
the adversarial and poisoning attacks. For instance, in the case of
ISIC (Figure 7 (c)), with fidelity loss fixed as 0.2, the adversarial
attack achieves κ about 0.25; with specificity loss fixed as 0.2, the
poisoning attack attains κ around 0.4; while IMC reaches κ above 0.8
under this setting. This is explained by that IMC employs a stronger
threat model to jointly optimize the perturbations introduced at
both training and inference.
Second, IMC is able to attain attack efficacy unreachable by using
each attack vector alone. Across all the cases, IMC achieves κ = 1
under proper fidelity and specificity settings, while the adversarial
(or poisoning) attack alone (even with fidelity or specificity loss
fixed as 1) is only able to reach κ less than 0.9.
Amplification Effect
Adversarial inputs and poisoned models amplify each other
and give rise to attack efficacy unreachable by using each
vector alone.
4.3.2 Empirical Implications. This amplification effect en-
tails profound implications for the adversary to design more effec-
tive attacks. Here we explore to use adversarial training [34, 43], one
state-of-the-art defense against adversarial attacks [2], to cleanse
poisoned models. Starting with the poisoned model, the re-training
iteratively updates it with adversarial inputs that deceive its current
configuration (i.e., adversarial “re-training”).
We perform adversarial re-training on each poisoned model θ∗
generated by IMC under varying fidelity-specificity trade-off (imple-
mentation details in Appendix B). We evaluate the re-trained model
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Dataset Maximum Perturbation
PGD IMC
CIFAR10 3 × 10−2 2 × 10−3
ImageNet 4 × 10−3 1 × 10−3
ISIC 2 × 10−1 1 × 10−3
GTSRB 1 × 10−1 2 × 10−2
Table 4. Maximum input perturbation magnitude for PGD and IMC.
θ˜∗ in terms of (i) the attack success rate of PGD (i.e., θ˜∗’s robustness
against regular adversarial attacks), (ii) the attack success rate of
θ∗’s corresponding adversarial input x∗ (i.e., θ˜∗’s robustness against
IMC), and (iii) θ˜∗’s overall accuracy over benign inputs in the testset.
Note that in order to work against the re-trained models, PGD is
enabled with significantly higher perturbation magnitude than IMC.
Table 4 summarizes PGD and IMC’s maximum allowed perturbation
magnitude (i.e., fidelity loss) for each dataset.
Observe that adversarial re-training greatly improves the ro-
bustness against PGD, which is consistent with prior work [34, 43].
Yet, due to the amplification effect, IMC retains its high attack ef-
fectiveness against the re-trained model. For instance, in the case
of ISIC (Figure 8 (c)), even with the maximum perturbation, PGD
attains less than 40% success rate; in comparison, with two orders
of magnitude lower perturbation, IMC succeeds with close to 80%
chance. This also implies that adversarial re-training is in general
ineffective against IMC. Also observe that by slightly increasing the
input perturbation magnitude, IMC sharply improves the specificity
of the poisoned model (e.g., average accuracy over benign inputs),
which is attributed to the leverage effect. Note that while here IMC
is not adapted to adversarial re-training, it is possible to further
optimize the poisoned model by taking account of this defense
during training, similar to [54].
4.4 Analytical Justification
We now provide analytical justification for the empirical observa-
tions regarding the mutual reinforcement effects.
4.4.1 Loss Measures. Without loss of generality, we consider
a binary classification setting (i.e., Y = {0, 1}), with (1 − t) and t
being the benign input x◦’s ground-truth class and the adversary’s
target class respectively. Let ft (x ;θ ) be the model θ ’s predicted
probability that x belongs to t . Under this setting, we quantify the
set of attack objectives as follows.
Efficacy – The attack succeeds only if the adversarial input x∗
and poisoned model θ∗ force ft (x∗;θ∗) to exceed 0.5 (i.e., the input
crosses the classification boundary). We thus useκ ≜ ft (x◦;θ◦)−0.5
to measure the current gap between θ◦’s prediction regarding x◦
and the adversary’s target class t .
Fidelity – We quantify the fidelity loss using the Lp -norm of the
input perturbation: ℓf (x∗) = ∥x∗ − x◦∥p . For two adversarial inputs
x∗,x ′∗ , we say x∗ < x ′∗ if ℓf (x∗) < ℓf (x ′∗). For simplicity, we use p = 2,
while the analysis generalizes to other norms as well.
As shown in Figure 9 (a), in a successful adversarial attack (with
the adversarial input x¯∗), if the perturbation magnitude is small
enough, we can approximate the fidelity loss as x◦’s distance to
the classification boundary [37]: ℓf (x¯∗) ≈ κ/∥∇x ℓ(x◦;θ◦)∥2, where a
linear approximation is applied to the loss function. In the following,
we denote h ≜ ℓf (x¯∗).
Specificity – Recall that the poisoned model θ∗ modifies x◦’s sur-
rounding classification boundary, as shown in Figure 9 (b). While it
is difficult to exactly describe the classification boundaries encoded
by DNNs [17], we approximate the local boundary surrounding an
input with the surface of a d-dimensional sphere, where d is the
input dimensionality. This approximation is justified as follows.
First, it uses a quadratic form, which is more expressive than a
linear approximation [37]. Second, it reflects the impact of model
complexity on the boundary: the maximum possible curvature of
the boundary is often determined by the model’s inherent complex-
ity [17]. For instance, the curvature of a linearmodel is 0, while a one
hidden-layer neural network with an infinite number of neurons
is able to model arbitrary boundaries [12]. We relate the model’s
complexity to the maximum possible curvature, which corresponds
to the minimum possible radius of the sphere.
The boundaries before and after the attacks are thus described
by two hyper-spherical caps. As the boundary before the attack is
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fixed, without loss of generality, we assume it to be flat for simplic-
ity. Now according to Eqn (9), the specificity loss is measured by
the number of inputs whose classifications are changed due to θ .
Following the assumptions, such inputs reside in a d-dimensional
hyper-spherical cap, as shown in Figure 9 (b). Due to its minuscule
scale, the probability density pdata in this cap is roughly constant.
Minimizing the specificity loss is thus equivalent to minimizing the
cap volume [41], which amounts to maximizing the curvature of
the sphere (or minimizing its radius). Let r be the minimum radius
induced by the model. We quantify the specificity loss as:
ℓs(θ ) = pdata
π
d−1
2 rd
Γ
(
d+1
2
) ∫ arccos(1− hr )
0
sind (t) dt (10)
where Γ(z) ≜
∫ ∞
0 t
z−1e−t dt is the Gamma function.
4.4.2 Mutual Reinforcement Effects. Let x¯∗, θ¯∗ be the ad-
versarial input and poisoned model given by the adversarial and
poisoning attacks respectively, and (x∗,θ∗) be the adversarial input
and poisoned model generated by IMC. Note that for fixed attack
efficacy, x∗ = x¯∗ if θ∗ = θ◦ and θ∗ = θ¯∗ if x∗ = x◦.
Leverage Effect –We now quantify the leverage effect in the case
of trading fidelity for specificity, while the alternative case can be
derived similarly. Specifically, this effect is measured by the ratio
of specificity “saving” versus fidelity “cost”, which we term as the
leverage effect coefficient:
ϕ(x∗,θ∗) ≜ 1 − ℓs(θ∗)/ℓs(θ¯∗)
ℓf (x∗)/ℓf (x¯∗)
(11)
Intuitively, the numerator is the specificity “saving”, while the
denominator is the fidelity “cost”. We say that the trade-off is sig-
nificantly disproportionate, if ϕ(x∗,θ∗) ≫ 1, i.e., the saving dwarfs
the cost. It is trivial to verify that if ϕ(x∗,θ∗) ≫ 1 then the effect of
trading specificity for fidelity is also significant ϕ(θ∗,x∗) ≫ 1.3
Consider the IMC attack as shown in Figure 9 (c). The adversarial
input x∗ moves towards the classification boundary and reduces
the loss by κ ′(κ ′ < κ). The perturbation magnitude is thus at least
κ ′/∥∇x ℓ(x◦;θ◦)∥2. The relative fidelity loss is given by:
ℓf (x∗)/ℓf (x¯∗) = κ ′/κ (12)
Below we use z = κ ′/κ for a short notation.
Meanwhile, it is straightforward to derive that the height of the
hyper-spherical cap is (1 − z)h. The relative specificity loss is thus:
ℓs(θ∗)/ℓs(θ¯∗) =
∫ arccos(1− hr +z hr )
0 sin
d (t) dt∫ arccos(1− hr )
0 sin
d (t) dt
(13)
Instantiating Eqn (11) with Eqn (12) and Eqn (13), the leverage
effect of trading fidelity for specificity is defined as:
ϕ(x∗,θ∗) =
∫ arccos(1− hr )
arccos
(
1− hr +z hr
) sind (t) dt
z
∫ arccos(1− hr )
0 sin
d (t) dt
(14)
3If (1 − x )/y ≫ 1 then (1 − y)/x ≫ 1 for 0 < x, y < 1.
The following proposition justifies the effect of trading fidelity
for specificity (proof in Appendix A). A similar argument can be
derived for trading specificity for fidelity.
Proposition 2. The leverage effect defined in Eqn (14) is strictly
greater than 1 for any 0 < z < 1.
Intuitively, to achieve fixed attack efficacy (κ), with a slight in-
crease of fidelity loss ℓf (x∗), the specificity loss ℓs(θ∗) is reduced
super-linearly.
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Figure 10: Leverage effect with respect to the relative fidelity loss z
and the minimum radius r (with d = 50).
Figure 10 evaluates this effect as a function of relative fidelity loss
under varying setting of h/r . Observe that the effect is larger than
1 by a large margin, especially for small fidelity loss κ ′/κ, which is
consistent with our empirical observation: with little fidelity cost,
it is possible to significantly reduce the specificity loss.
Amplification Effect – From Proposition 2, we can also derive the
explanation for the amplification effect.
Consider an adversarial input x∗ that currently achieves attack
efficacy κ ′ with relative fidelity loss κ ′/κ. Applying the poisoned
model θ∗ with relative specificity loss (1−κ ′/κ)/ϕ(x∗,θ∗), the adver-
sary is able to attain attack efficacy κ. In other words, the poisoned
model θ∗ “amplifies” the attack efficacy of the adversarial input
x∗ by κ/κ ′ times, with cost much lower than required by using
the adversarial attack alone to reach the same attack efficacy (i.e.,
1 − κ ′/κ), given that ϕ(x∗,θ∗) ≫ 1 in Proposition 2.
5 IMC-OPTIMIZED ATTACKS
In this section, we demonstrate that IMC, as a general attack frame-
work, can be exploited to enhance existing attacks with respect
to multiple metrics. We further discuss potential countermeasures
against such optimized attacks and their technical challenges.
5.1 Attack Optimization
5.1.1 Basic Attack. We consider TrojanNN [32], a representa-
tive backdoor attack, as the reference attack model. At a high level,
TrojanNN defines a specific pattern (e.g., watermark) as the trig-
ger and enforces the poisoned model to misclassify all the inputs
embedded with this trigger. As it optimizes both the trigger and
poisoned model, TrojanNN enhances other backdoor attacks (e.g.,
BadNet [21]) that employ fixed trigger patterns.
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Specifically, the attack consists of three steps. (i) First, the trigger
pattern is partially defined in an ad hoc manner; that is, the water-
mark shape (e.g., square) and embedding position are pre-specified.
(ii) Then, the concrete pixel values of the trigger are optimized
to activate neurons rarely activated by benign inputs, in order to
minimize the impact on benign inputs. (iii) Finally, the model is
re-trained to enhance the effectiveness of the trigger pattern.
Note that within TrojanNN, the operations of trigger optimiza-
tion and model re-training are executed independently. It is thus
possible that after re-training, the neurons activated by the trigger
pattern may deviate from the originally selected neurons, resulting
in suboptimal trigger patterns and/or poisoned models. Also note
that TrojanNN works without access to the training data; yet, to
make fair comparison, in the following evaluation, TrojanNN also
uses the original training data to construct the backdoors.
5.1.2 Enhanced Attacks. We optimize TrojanNN within the
IMC framework. Compared with optimizing the trigger only [29],
IMC improves TrojanNN in terms of both attack effectiveness and
evasiveness. Specifically, let r denote the trigger. We initialize r
with the trigger pre-defined by TrojanNN and optimize it using the
co-optimization procedure. To this end, we introduce a mask m
for the given benign input x◦. For x◦’s i-th dimension (pixel), we
definem[i] = 1 − p (p is the transparency setting) if i is covered
by the watermark andm[i] = 0 otherwise. Thus the perturbation
operation is defined as x∗ = ψ (x◦, r ;m) = x◦ ⊙ (1 −m) + r ⊙ m,
where ⊙ denotes element-wise multiplication. We reformulate the
backdoor attack in Eqn (5) as follows:
min
θ,r,m
Ex◦∈T [ℓ(ψ (x◦, r ;m), t ;θ )] + λℓf (m) + νℓs(θ ) (15)
where we define the fidelity loss in terms ofm. Typically, ℓf (m) is
defined asm’s L1 norm and ℓs(θ ) is the accuracy drop on benign
cases similar to Eqn (9).
Algorithm 2 sketches the optimization procedure of Eqn (15). It
alternates between optimizing the trigger and mask (line 4) and
optimizing the poisoned model (line 5). Specifically, during the
trigger perturbation step, we apply the Adam optimizer [26]. Fur-
ther, instead of directly optimizing r which is bounded by [0, 1],
we apply change-of-variable and optimize over a new variable
wr ∈ (−∞,+∞), such that r = (tanh(wr ) + 1)/2 (the same trick
is also applied onm). Note that Algorithm 2 represents a general
optimization framework, which is adaptable to various settings.
For instance, one may specify all the non-zero elements ofm to
share the same transparency or optimize the transparency of each
element independently (details in § 5.2 and § 5.3). In the following,
we term the enhanced TrojanNN as TrojanNN∗.
5.2 Optimization against Human Vision
We first show that TrojanNN∗ is optimizable in terms of its evasive-
ness with respect to human vision. The evasiveness is quantified by
the size and transparency (or opacity) of trigger patterns. Without
loss of generality, we use square-shaped triggers. The trigger size
is measured by the ratio of its width over the image width.
Figure 11 illustrates TrojanNN∗’s attack efficacy (average mis-
classification confidence of trigger-embedded inputs) under varying
evasiveness constraints. Observe that the efficacy increases sharply
as a function of the trigger size or opacity. Interestingly, the trigger
Algorithm 2: TrojanNN∗ Attack
Input: initial trigger mask –m◦; benign model – θ◦; target class – t ;
hyper-parameters – λ, ν
Output: trigger mask –m; trigger pattern – r , poisoned model – θ∗
// initialization
1 θ (0), k ← θ◦, 0;
2 m(0), r (0) ←m0, TrojanNN(m0);
// optimization
3 while not converged yet do
// trigger perturbation
4 r (k+1),m(k+1) ←
arg minr ,m Ex◦∈T [ℓ(ψ (x◦, r ;m), t ; θ (k ))] + λℓf (m);
// model perturbation
5 θ (k+1) ← arg minθ Ex◦∈T [ℓ(ψ (x◦, r (k );m(k )), t ; θ )] + ν ℓs(θ );
6 k ← k + 1;
7 return (m(k ), r (k ), θ (k ));
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Figure 11: Attack efficacy of TrojanNN∗ as a function of trigger size
and transparency.
size and opacity also demonstrate strong mutual reinforcement
effects: (i) leverage - for fixed attack efficacy, by a slight increase
in opacity (or size), it significantly reduces the size (or opacity); (ii)
amplification - for fixed opacity (or size), by slightly increasing size
(or opacity), it greatly boosts the attack efficacy.
TrojanNN TrojanNN* (opt. w.r.t. opacity) TrojanNN* (opt. w.r.t. size)
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Figure 12: Sample triggers generated by TrojanNN (a), TrojanNN∗ op-
timizing opacity (b) and optimizing size (c).
To further validate the leverage effect, we compare the triggers
generated by TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗. Figure 12 shows sample
triggers given by TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗ under fixed attack effi-
cacy (with κ = 0.95). It is observed that compared with TrojanNN,
TrojanNN∗ significantly increases the trigger transparency (under
fixed size) or minimizes the trigger size (under fixed opacity).
To further validate the amplification effect, we measure the at-
tack success rate (ASR) of TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗ under varying
evasiveness constraints (with κ = 0.95), with results shown in Fig-
ure 13 and 14. It is noticed that across all the datasets, TrojanNN∗
outperforms TrojanNN by a large margin under given trigger size
and opacity. For instance, in the case of GTSRB (Figure 13 (d)), with
10
trigger size and transparency fixed as 0.4 and 0.7, TrojanNN∗ out-
performs TrojanNN by 0.39 in terms of ASR; in the case of CIFAR10
(Figure 14 (a)), with trigger size and transparency fixed as 0.3 and
0.2, the ASRs of TrojanNN∗ and TrojanNN differ by 0.36.
We can thus conclude that leveraging the co-optimization frame-
work, TrojanNN∗ is optimizable with respect to human detection
without affecting its attack effectiveness.
5.3 Optimization against Detection Methods
In this set of experiments, we demonstrate that TrojanNN∗ is also
optimizable in terms of its evasiveness with respect to multiple
automated detection methods.
5.3.1 Backdoor Detection. The existing backdoor detection
methods can be roughly classified in two categories based on their
application stages and detection targets. The first class is applied at
themodel inspection stage and aims to detect suspiciousmodels and
potential backdoors [9, 31, 51]; the other class is applied at inference
time and aims to detect trigger-embedded inputs [8, 10, 15, 18]. In
our evaluation, we use NeuralCleanse [51] and STRIP [18] as the
representative methods of the two categories. In Appendix C, we
also evaluate TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗ against ABS [31], another
state-of-the-art backdoor detector.
NeuralCleanse – For a given DNN, NeuralCleanse searches for
potential triggers in every class. Intuitively, if a class is embedded
with a backdoor, the minimum perturbation (measured by its L1-
norm) necessary to change all the inputs in this class to the target
class is abnormally smaller than other classes. Empirically, after
running the trigger search algorithm over 1,600 randomly sampled
inputs for 10 epochs, a class with its minimum perturbation nor-
malized by median absolute deviation exceeding 2.0 is considered
to contain a potential backdoor with 95% confidence.
STRIP – For a given input, STRIPmixes it up with a benign input
using equal weights, feeds the mixture to the target model, and
computes the entropy of the prediction vector (i.e., self-entropy).
Intuitively, if the input is embedded with a trigger, the mixture is
still dominated by the trigger and tends to be misclassified to the
target class, resulting in relatively low self-entropy; otherwise, the
self-entropy tends to be higher. To reduce variance, for a given input,
we average its self-entropy with respect to 8 randomly sampled
benign inputs. We set the positive threshold as 0.05 and measure
STRIP’s effectiveness using F-1 score.
5.3.2 Attack Optimization. We optimize TrojanNN∗ in terms
of its evasiveness with respect to both NeuralCleanse and STRIP.
Both detectors aim to detect anomaly under certain metrics, which
we integrate into the loss terms in Algorithm 2.
Specifically, NeuralCleanse searches for potential trigger with
minimum L1-norm, which is related to the maskm. We thus instan-
tiate the fidelity loss ℓf (m) asm’s L1-norm and optimize it during
the trigger perturbation step. To normalize ℓf (m) to an appropri-
ate scale, we set the hyper-parameter λ as the number of pixels
covered by the trigger. Meanwhile, STRIP mixes adversarial and
benign inputs and computes the self-entropy of the mixtures, which
highly depends on the model’s behaviors. We thus instantiate the
specificity loss ℓs(θ ) as Ex,x ′∈R [−H (f ( x∗2 + x
′
2 ;θ ))], in which we
randomly mix up an adversarial input x∗ (via perturbing a benign
input x ) and another benign input x ′ and maximize the self-entropy
of their mixture.
5.3.3 Detection Evasiveness. We apply the above two de-
tectors to detect TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗, with results summa-
rized in Figure 15. We have the following observations. First, the
two detectors are fairly effective against TrojanNN. In comparison,
TrojanNN∗ demonstrates much higher evasiveness. For instance, in
the case of GTSRB (Figure 15 (b)), with trigger size fixed as 0.4, the
anomaly measures of TrojanNN∗ and TrojanNN by NeuralCleanse
differ by over 2, while the F-1 scores on TrojanNN∗ and TrojanNN
by STRIP differ by more than 0.3. We thus conclude that TrojanNN∗
is optimizable in terms of evasiveness with respect to multiple
detection methods simultaneously.
5.4 Potential Countermeasures
Now we discuss potential mitigation against IMC-optimized attacks
and their technical challenges. It is shown above that using detectors
against adversarial inputs or poisoned models independently is
often insufficient to defend against IMC-optimized attacks, due to
the mutual reinforcement effects. One possible solution is to build
ensemble detectors that integrate individual ones and detect IMC-
optimized attacks based on both input and model anomaly.
To assess the feasibility of this idea, we build an ensemble detec-
tor against TrojanNN∗ via integrating NeuralCleanse and STRIP.
Specifically, we perform the following detection procedure: (i) ap-
plying NeuralCleanse to identify the potential trigger, (ii) for a
given input, attaching the potential trigger to a benign input, (iii)
mixing this benign input up with the given input under varying
mixture weights, (iv) measuring the self-entropy of these mixtures,
and (v) using the standard deviation of the self-entropy values to
distinguish benign and trigger-embedded inputs.
Intuitively, if the given input is trigger-embedded, the mixture
combines two trigger-embedded inputs and is thus dominated by
one of the two triggers, regardless of the mixture weight, resulting
in a low deviation of self-entropy. In comparison, if the given input
is benign, the mixture is dominated by the trigger only if the weight
is one-sided, resulting in a high deviation of self-entropy.
We compare the performance of the basic and ensemble STRIP
against TrojanNN∗ (the detection against TrojanNN is deferred to
Appendix C). As shown in Figure 16, the ensemble detector per-
forms slightly better across all the cases, implying the effectiveness
of the ensemble approach. However, the improvement is marginal
(less than 0.2), especially in the case of small-sized triggers. This
may be explained by the inherent challenges of defending against
IMC-optimized attacks: due to the mutual reinforcement effects,
TrojanNN∗ attains high attack efficacy with minimal input and
model distortion; it thus requires to carefully account for such
effects in order to design effective countermeasures.
6 RELATEDWORK
With their increasing use in security-sensitive domains, DNNs are
becoming the new targets of malicious manipulations [3]. Two
primary attack vectors have been considered in the literature: ad-
versarial inputs and poisoned models.
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Adversarial Inputs. The existing research on adversarial in-
puts is divided in two campaigns.
One line of work focuses on developing new attacks against
DNNs [7, 20, 40, 48], with the aim of crafting adversarial samples
to force DNNs to misbehave. The existing attacks can be catego-
rized as untargeted (in which the adversary desires to simply force
misclassification) and targeted (in which the adversary attempts to
force the inputs to be misclassified into specific classes).
Another line of work attempts to improve DNN resilience against
adversarial attacks by devising new training strategies (e.g., adver-
sarial training) [22, 28, 39, 49] or detection mechanisms [19, 33, 35,
53]. However, the existing defenses are often penetrated or circum-
vented by even stronger attacks [2, 30], resulting in a constant arms
race between the attackers and defenders.
Poisoned Models. The poisoned model-based attacks can be
categorized according to their target inputs. In the poisoning at-
tacks, the target inputs are defined as non-modified inputs, while
the adversary’s goal is to force such inputs to be misclassified by the
poisoned DNNs [24, 25, 44, 47, 52]. In the backdoor attacks, specific
trigger patterns (e.g., a particular watermark) are pre-defined, while
the adversary’s goal is to force any inputs embedded with such
triggers to be misclassified by the poisoned models [21, 32]. Note
that compared with the poisoning attacks, the backdoor attacks
leverage both adversarial inputs and poisoned models.
The existing defense methods against poisoned models mostly
focus on the backdoor attacks, which, according to their strategies,
can be categorized as: (i) cleansing potential contaminated data at
the training stage [50], (ii) identifying suspicious models during
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model inspection [9, 31, 51], and (iii) detecting trigger-embedded
inputs at inference time [8, 10, 15, 18].
Despite the intensive research on adversarial inputs and poisoned
models in parallel, there is still a lack of understanding about their
inherent connections. This work bridges this gap by studying the
two attack vectors within a unified framework and providing a
holistic view of the vulnerabilities of DNNs deployed in practice.
7 CONCLUSION
This work represents a solid step towards understanding adver-
sarial inputs and poisoned models in a unified manner. We show
both empirically and analytically that (i) there exist intriguing mu-
tual reinforcement effects between the two attack vectors, (ii) the
adversary is able to exploit such effects to optimize attacks with
respect to multiple metrics, and (iii) it requires to carefully account
for such effects in designing effective countermeasures against the
optimized attacks. We believe our findings shed light on the holistic
vulnerabilities of DNNs deployed in realistic settings.
This work also opens a few avenues for further investigation.
First, besides the targeted, white-box attacks considered in this
paper, it is interesting to study the connections between the two
vectors under alternative settings (e.g., untargeted, black-box at-
tacks). Second, enhancing other types of threats (e.g., latent back-
door attacks) within the input-model co-optimization framework is
a direction worthy of exploration. Finally, devising a unified robust-
ness metric accounting for both vectors may serve as a promising
starting point for developing effective countermeasures.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs
A0. Preliminaries. In the following proofs, we use the follow-
ing definitions for notational simplicity:
α ≜ h/r
y ≜ 1 − z
Further we have the following result.∫ arccos (x )
0
sind (t)dt =
∫ 1
x
(
1 − t2
) d−1
2 dt(16)
A1. Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof: Recall that Fϵ (x◦) represents a non-empty compact set,
ℓ(x ; ·) is differentiable for x ∈ Fϵ (x◦), and ∇θ ℓ(x ,θ ) is continuous
over the domains Fϵ (x◦) × Rn .
Let F ∗ϵ (x◦) = {arg minx ∈Fϵ (x◦) ℓ(x ;θ )} be the set of minimizers
and ℓ(θ ) ≜ minx ∈Fϵ (x◦) ℓ(x ;θ ). The Danskin’s theorem [13] states
that ℓ(θ ) is locally continuous and directionally differentiable. The
derivative of ℓ(θ ) along the direction d is given by
Dd ℓ(θ ) = min
x ∈F∗ϵ (x◦)
d⊤∇θ ℓ(x ,θ )
We apply the Danskin’s theorem to our case. Let x∗ ∈ Fϵ (x◦) be a
minimizer of minx ℓ(x ;θ ). Consider the direction d = −∇θ ℓ(x∗;θ ).
We then have:
Dd ℓ(θ ) = min
x ∈F∗ϵ (x◦)
d⊤∇θ ℓ(x ,θ )
≤ −∥∇θ ℓ(x∗,θ )∥22 ≤ 0
Thus, it follows that ∇θ ℓ(x∗;θ ) is a proper descent direction of
minx ∈Fϵ (x◦) ℓ(x ;θ ). □
Note that in the proof above, we ignore the constraint of θ ∈
Fδ (θ◦). Nevertheless, the conclusion is still valid. With this con-
straint, instead of considering the global optimum of θ , we essen-
tially consider its local optimum within Fδ (θ◦). Further, for DNNs
that use constructs such as ReLU, the loss function is not necessarily
continuously differentiable. However, since the set of discontinu-
ities has measure zero, this is not an issue in practice.
A2. Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof: Proving ϕ(x∗,θ∗) > 1 is equivalent to showing the follow-
ing inequality:∫ arccos (1−yα )
0 sin
d (t)dt
y
<
∫ arccos (1−α )
0
sind (t)dt
We define f (y) = 1y
∫ arccos(1−yα )
0 sin
d (t)dt . This inequality is
equivalent to f (y) < f (1) for y ∈ (0, 1). It thus suffices to prove
f ′(y) > 0.
Considering Eqn (16), we have f (y) = 1y
∫ 1
1−yα
(
1 − t2) d−12 dt
and f ′(y) = д(y)/y2 where
д(y) = yα
(
1 − (1 − yα)2
) d−1
2 −
∫ 1
1−yα
(
1 − t2
) d−1
2 dt
Denote x = 1 − yα . We have
д(x) = (1 + x) d−12 (1 − x) d+12 −
∫ 1
x
(
1 − t2
) d−1
2 dt
Note that д(1) = 0. With d > 1, we have
д′(x) = − (d − 1)x (1 + x) d−32 (1 − x) d−12 < 0
Therefore,д(x) > 0 for x ∈ (0, 1), which in turn implies f ′(y) > 0
for y ∈ (0, 1). □
B. Implementation Details
Here we elaborate on the implementation of attacks and defenses
in this paper.
B1. Parameter Setting. Table 5 summarizes the default param-
eter setting in our empirical evaluation (§ 4).
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Attack/Defense Parameter Setting
IMC
perturbation threshold ϵ = 2 × 10−3
learning rate α = 1 × 10−4
maximum iterations niter = 20
PGD
PGD ϵ = 8/255
learning rate α = 3/255
maximum iterations niter = 20
Manifold Transformation network structure [3,‘average’,3]random noise std vnoise = 0.1
Adversarial Re-Training
optimizer SGD
hop steps m = 4
learning rate α = 0.015
learning rate decay γ = 0.9 per 10 epochs
TrojanNN
neuron number nneuron = 2
threshold 5
target value 10
STRIP number of tests ntest = 8
Table 5. Default Parameter Setting
B2. Curvature Profile. Exactly computing the eigenvalues of
the Hessian matrixHx = ∇2x ℓ(x) is prohibitively expensive for high-
dimensional data. We use a finite difference approximation in our
implementation. For any given vector z, the Hessian-vector product
Hxz can be approximated by:
Hxz = lim
∆→0
∇x ℓ(x + ∆z) − ∇x ℓ(x)
∆
(17)
By properly setting ∆, this approximation allows us to measure the
variation of gradient in x ’s vicinity, rather than an infinitesimal
point-wise curvature[38]. In practice we set z as the gradient sign
direction to capture the most variation:
z =
sgn(∇ℓ(x))
∥ sgn(∇ℓ(x))∥ (18)
and estimate the magnitude of curvature as
∥∇x ℓ(x + ∆z) − ∇x ℓ(x)∥2 (19)
We use Eqn (19) throughout the evaluation to compute the curvature
profiles of given inputs.
C. Additional Experiments
Here we provide experiment results additional to § 4 and § 5.
C1. Detection of TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗ by ABS. In addi-
tion to STRIP and NeuralCleanse, here we also evaluate TrojanNN
and TrojanNN∗ against ABS [31], another state-of-the-art backdoor
detectionmethod. As the optimization of TrojanNN∗ requires white-
box access to ABS, we re-implement ABS according to [31]4. In the
evaluation, we set the number of seed images as 5 per class and the
maximum trojan size as 400.
Similar to NeuralCleanse, ABS attempts to detect potential back-
doors embedded in given DNNs during model inspection. In a nut-
shell, its execution consists of two steps: (i) inspecting the given
DNN to sift out abnormal neurons with large elevation difference
(i.e., highly active only with respect to one particular class), and
(ii) identifying potential trigger patterns by maximizing abnormal
neuron activation while preserving normal neuron behaviors.
4The re-implementation may have differences from the original ABS (https://github.
com/naiyeleo/ABS).
To optimize the evasiveness of TrojanNN∗ with respect to ABS,
we integrate the cost function (Algorithm 2 in [31]) into the loss
terms ℓf and ℓs in Algorithm 2 and optimize the trigger r and model
θ respectively to minimize this cost function.
The detection of TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗ by ABS on CIFAR10 is
shown in Figure 17. Observe that ABS detects TrojanNN with close
to 100% accuracy, which is consistent with the findings in [31]. In
comparison, TrojanNN∗ is able to effectively evade ABS especially
when the trigger size is sufficiently large. For instance, the detection
rate (measured by maximum re-mask accuracy) drops to 40% as the
trigger size increases to 0.4. This could be explained by that larger
trigger size entails more operation space for TrojanNN∗ to optimize
the trigger to evade ABS.
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Figure 17: Detection of TrojanNN and TrojanNN∗ by ABS on CIFAR10.
C2. Basic and Ensemble STRIP against TrojanNN. Figure 18
below compares the performance of basic and ensemble STRIP
in detecting TrojanNN. Interestingly, in contrary to the detection
of TrojanNN∗ (Figure 16), here the basic STRIP outperforms the
ensemble version. This may be explained as follows. As TrojanNN∗
is optimized to evade both STRIP and NeuralCleanse, to effectively
detect it, ensemble STRIP needs to balance the metrics of both
detectors; in contrast, TrojanNN is not optimized with respect to
either detector. The compromise of ensemble STRIP results in its
inferior performance compared with the basic detector.
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Figure 18: Detection of basic and ensemble STRIP against TrojanNN
on CIFAR10 and GTSRB.
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